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Understanding China’s Grain Procurement Policy from a Perspective of 
Optimization 
 
1.  Introduction 
China established the unified procurement and sales system for grain (hereafter 
the grain procurement system) in 1953 as part of its ambitious pursuit of industrialization 
under central planning. The system required farmers to sell to the grain bureaus some 
specified quota amount of grain at suppressed prices and allowed qualified urban non-
agricultural residents under the household registration (hukou) system to buy rationed 
grain from these agents at similarly suppressed sales prices. It therefore extracted 
economic surpluses from the grain sector for industrial investment by reducing the cost of 
wage-goods and thereby suppressing wages paid to urban industrial workers. Apparently 
the first underlying objective of China’s grain procurement policy was to tax agriculture 
and support industry, similar to that of the redistribution policies in many developing 
countries (Krueger, 1993; Anderson, 2009).  
While the unified procurement and sales system covered almost all agricultural 
products in the central planning period for the purpose of redistribution, it lasted the 
longest for grain.
1
 The reluctance of China’s policymakers to relinquish the control over 
grain marketing as compared to other industrial inputs in the reform period can be 
attributed to the objective of safeguarding food security for the urban non-agricultural 
residents.  The adherence to this second objective had been central to the evolution of the 
                                                           
1
 China abolished the state procurement of most agricultural products by the first half of the 1990s 
except for grain and cotton. The cotton distribution was liberalized in 1998 when the government stopped 
its direct price intervention. Similar liberation in grain distribution took place only in the early 2000s. 
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state grain procurement system until the second half of the 1990s. It should be noted that 
China has adopted since the 1950s a set of complementary policies including the 
restrictions on the use of arable land, the prohibition of rural-to-urban labor movement 
through the hukou system, the tight grip on grain imports, and the state investments in 
rural infrastructure and technologies to boost grain self-sufficiency and thereby maintain 
food security for the whole nation. The state-controlled grain procurement system, the 
most important component of the policy set until its liberalization in the 2000s, served 
mainly to secure urban food security by targeting only urban non-agricultural households 
as the qualified consumers of the procured grain.  
Until the late 1990s, China’s policymakers always faced a dilemma in setting the 
procurement price and quota under the grain procurement system. While they needed to 
lower the procurement price to extract economic surpluses from any given quota, the 
disincentive effect discouraged farmers from delivering the assigned quota, which might 
jeopardize urban food security. It may be a general perception that under central planning 
the procurement plan would be enforced by socialist ideological education or punitive 
measures. However, it has been reported that even in the central planning era farmers 
expressed their dissatisfaction with the suppressed procurement prices by reducing the 
amount of grain they delivered, which in turn forced the government to raise the prices 
(Yuan, 1994). Despite the many failures in plan enforcement observed throughout the 
history of China’s grain procurement system, one could not conclude that the policy was 
made without regard to farmers’ reaction. Rather, it could be due to inaccurate 
assessment of the situation and the problems with implementation.  
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The Chinese policymakers’ awareness of the need to incorporate farmers’ reaction 
in the policymaking process is reflected in the numerous adjustments in procurement 
policy in the central planning era that aimed to boost farmers’ incentives, including the 
price premium for above-quota delivery and material rewards tied to grain delivery.  In 
the reform period, economic incentives were further enhanced by not only substantially 
raising fixed and above-quota procurement prices but also officially sanctioning market 
sales. With the establishment of the dual-track grain procurement system in 1985, those 
farmers who fulfilled their delivery quota would be allowed to sell surplus grain on the 
market. It signifies the increased reliance on the market to provide economic incentives to 
boost efficiency. It would be illuminating to examine China’s grain procurement policy 
formulation under the dual-track system from an optimization perspective with reference 
to policymakers’ objectives and farmers’ reaction.  
Theoretical analyses of China’s dual-track procurement system are few. Sicular 
(1988) and Lau et al. (2000) focus on its efficiency and distributional effects. Assuming 
legal resale of goods between the plan track and the market track, they arrive at the same 
conclusion that efficient resource allocation can be achieved under the dual-track system. 
It is important to note that their conclusions regarding the efficiency impact of the dual-
track system hinge on the assumption of successful enforcement of the state plan. Yet 
both studies assume exogenous procurement quota and price without considering the 
constraints on the setting of state plan to ensure enforcement. 
There are some theoretical and empirical studies in the Chinese literature that 
analyze the case of enforcement failure or endogenous procurement quota and conclude 
that the procurement price has a positive impact on grain output (Cheng et al., 1993; Lin, 
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2000; Wang and Huang, 2001). Yet, there is no study that directly addresses the issue as 
to how the procurement price and quota are set to enforce the state plan. We make use of 
the endogenous theory of economic policy to fill this gap. 
The endogenous theory of economic policy that recognizes policymakers as 
rational agents maximizing their political preference function subject to political and 
economic constraints has been widely applied in the study of government intervention in 
the farm commodity markets (Gardner, 1983, 1987; Oehmke and Yao, 1990; Rausser and 
Foster, 1990; Bullock, 1994). Based on the interactions between the government and 
various interest groups whose welfare will be affected by the policy concerned, the 
political preference function is a useful tool to analyze government policies regarding the 
pricing and trade of grain in the OECD countries including the US, Japan, and Korea 
(Oehmke and Yao, 1990; Lee and Kennedy, 2006). Specifying the function to capture the 
features of China’s policy-making process, we will analyze the formulation of China’s 
grain procurement policy. 
Using an optimization model, the present paper examines the choice of the 
procurement price and quota to enforce the state plan, or to induce quota fulfillment. 
Following the results of Sicular (1988) and Lau et al. (2000), we assume that the dual-
track procurement system does not distort resource allocation when the state plan can be 
enforced. We hypothesize that Chinese policymakers are rational decision makers who 
formulate grain policies in such a way as to maximize their political preference function 
subject to certain constraints. While a voluminous literature has been devoted to the study 
of China’s grain sector and its procurement system, this is the first attempt to use an 
optimization model to explain the choice of the procurement price and quota. 
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The specification of the political preference function captures the two objectives 
of China’s grain procurement policy mentioned earlier, namely, sectoral income 
redistribution and urban food security. Together with the constraint on plan enforcement 
derived from farmers’ reaction, our model addresses the problem of policymaking 
regarding the procurement price and quota. Our results shed light on the following 
questions: 1) Would grain farmers be paid more than the minimum price necessary to 
induce quota delivery? 2) Why have China’s policymakers not adopted lump-sum tax to 
redistribute economic surplus from the grain sector to the industrial sector? 3) What 
happened around 1996 that apparently changed China’s policy stance from taxing to 
subsidizing grain production?  
We will show that the answers to the above questions hinge on the importance of 
urban food security perceived by China’s policymakers. As long as they stress urban food 
security and adhere to the state control of grain distribution, they will set the procurement 
price only at the minimum level necessary to induce quota fulfillment and prefer the 
quota procurement system to lump-sum tax as a means of redistribution. While many will 
attribute the apparent change in policy stance at end-1996 to the change in policymakers’ 
preference in favor of grain farmers’ welfare, our analysis shows that the switch from 
taxing to subsidizing farmers was largely a result of urban food security no longer being 
the guiding objective. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. The next section derives the constraint 
on the choice of the procurement price and quota with reference to grain farmers’ 
behavior under the dual-track system. Section 3 specifies the political preference function 
to capture the Chinese features and uses the optimization model to analyze some major 
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policy choices that characterize the evolution of the system. Section 4 concludes the 
paper. 
 
2.  The Minimum Procurement Price for Plan Enforcement 
China’s grain procurement system has gone through numerous modifications 
since the 1950s. It is beyond the scope of this paper to do a comprehensive analysis. 
Instead, we will focus on the dual-track procurement system implemented between 1985 
and the early 2000s. In essence, the dual-track system was installed to overcome the 
adverse effect on farmers’ production incentive of the suppressed procurement prices for 
quota grain with a view to improving quota delivery and allocative efficiency (see Cheng 
(1996) and Wu and McErlean (2003) for some concise overviews).  
Under the dual-track system, farmers who have fulfilled their quota can sell 
surplus grain at market-determined prices through two channels. The first one is 
voluntary above-quota deliveries to the grain bureaus at negotiated prices. These prices 
were not controlled by central directives but to be mutually agreed in response to market 
forces based on regional, seasonal, and quality factors (Sicular, 1993; Ke, 1995).
2
 The 
second channel is the free market including, for example, the periodic rural market fairs 
and grain wholesale markets that emerged in the 1990s. Before the implementation of 
price protection policy at end-1996, the prices of surplus grain sold through these two 
channels moved in tandem with the free market prices being slightly higher (PYC, 1997).  
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 Prior to the dual-track system, the grain bureaus also procured above-quota grain from farmers at 
higher prices. However, such procurement might not be voluntary and the prices were set by the 
government but not determined by market forces (Ke, 1995; Cheng, 1996). 
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The revival of rural markets for agricultural commodities began in China as early 
as in 1978 and restrictions on private trade were lifted in subsequent years for most farm 
products (Sicular, 1993; Huang and Rozelle, 2006). While maintaining mandatory 
procurement of grain, the grain bureaus participated in market transactions through 
negotiated procurement. The government enforced quota delivery by making it the 
condition for negotiated transactions and closing the free market until the procurement 
quota had been fulfilled (Ke, 1995; Wu and McErlean, 2003). Within the share of market 
transactions in grain procurement that increased from 9 percent in 1978 to over 65 
percent in 1998, negotiated transactions accounted for at least two-thirds of them until 
1992 and about one half between 1993 and 1998 (Huang, 2001). Therefore the state 
agents could to a considerable extent monitor the quota fulfillment of those farmers who 
wished to sell surplus grain at market prices.  
Abstracting from the crucial features of the dual-track procurement system, we 
specify the assumptions and construct the optimization model. First of all, we define the 
quantity of grain supplied by farmers as commercial grain that is net of their own 
consumption.
3
 We assume that farmers will fulfill their delivery quota only in response to 
sufficient incentives. In reality, the incentives would include both economic and political 
rewards, or punishments. For simplicity, we will only consider economic incentives in 
terms of farmers’ earnings.
4
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 Despite the cases of excessive procurement that jeopardized farmers’ livelihood in the central 
planning era, we argue that rational policymakers would not expect the procurement policy to be feasible 
without allowing for farmers’ subsistence.  
4
 This assumption will not alter the nature of the optimization problem. For example, if the grain 
bureaus exert political or economic threat to coerce farmers into fulfilling their quotas, there will still be a 
minimum procurement price required for plan enforcement, albeit lower than the minimum level derived 
later in this section. 
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To derive the constraint on the choice of the procurement price and quota with 
reference to farmers’ reaction, consider a dual-track system with the following 
assumptions. Farmers are required to deliver a quota amount of grain to the government 
at a fixed procurement price. Upon fulfillment of the quota, they can sell any amount of 
surplus grain on the market.
5
 The procurement price and quota are set by the government. 
When the procurement price is set below the market price, farmers are induced to fulfill 
the quota only by the privilege to sell surplus grain on the market. If the procurement 
price is set above the market price, the procurement quota will transfer income to farmers. 
We assume the free market price and the negotiated price are the same in our model.
6
 We 
further assume that all grain procured at market price will be sold to consumers at market 
price.
7
 
Farmers are profit maximizers with identical marginal cost curves. They have the 
option whether or not to deliver the quota. The only penalty on farmers for not fulfilling 
the quota is denying them access to the free market for surplus grain. Yet the government 
will buy at the procurement price whatever amount farmers supply within the quota. The 
procured grain will be sold to eligible buyers at or below the procurement price.
 
Given 
the bureaucratic authoritarian government of China, the cost of operating the sizable 
grain bureaus had not been the major concern in policymaking until the late 1990s. We 
will leave out the details of the implementation issues and assume that the grain bureaus 
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 In the actual implementation, farmers might choose to sell higher-value cash crops on the market 
after fulfilling their grain quotas. Nevertheless, this alternative action to take advantage of the market track 
would not alter the basic conclusion of our analysis. 
6
This simplifying assumption, which is justified by the observation that the two market-
determined prices moved closely together until 1996, will not alter the nature of the optimization problem.   
7
 Sometimes when the quota grain was not sufficient to meet the demand of qualified consumers 
for rationed grain, the grain bureaus would sell some of the grain procured at negotiated prices at the lower 
procurement prices incurring operating losses (Ke, 1995). We do not model this case as it is beyond the 
scope of this paper. 
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handle all transactions at zero cost. To rule out the possibility of allocative inefficiency 
that may result from having the rationed grain supplied to those low-marginal value 
urban users, we assume that the marginal benefit of these consumers is at least as high as 
the market price.8 
 
[Insert Fig. 1.] 
 
In Fig. 1, D(P) and S(P) respectively depict the market demand and supply curves 
under the free market system. S(P) is the horizontal sum of the identical marginal cost 
curves of individual farmers. Without government intervention in grain distribution, the 
equilibrium market price and quantity would be P* and Q*.  
The present paper does not address the efficiency issue as the grain procurement 
system per se need not distort resource allocation as long as the state plan is enforced 
(Sicular, 1988; Lau et al., 2000). Hence we assume that the enforcement of procurement 
plan will achieve the same resource allocation as in the free market producing the same 
quantity of grain as given by the intersection of the demand and supply curves in Fig. 1. 
Our model focuses only on the choice of optimal procurement price and quota to ensure 
plan enforcement. We assume that both the policymakers and the grain farmers know the 
shapes of the market demand and supply curves.
9
  
                                                           
8
 The presence of black markets for rationed grain coupons until the early 1990s, which transferred 
the rights to purchasing rationed grain from low-marginal value consumers to higher-marginal value 
consumers, helps justify this assumption.  
9
 This restrictive assumption can be replaced by the assumption of legal resale of goods between 
the plan track and the market track such that the procurement price becomes infra-marginal and does not 
affect the market equilibrium (see Lau et al., 1997 & 2000). 
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Let  P  and Q  be the procurement price and quota set by the policymakers. 
Suppose the P , Q  combination is set below the supply curve as depicted by, for 
example, point U in Fig. 1. Farmers have two options. First, they can fulfill the quota and 
then sell surplus grain on the market. Second, they can deliver a smaller amount of grain 
to the state, forsaking the privilege to access the free market. They will choose the option 
that brings a larger producer surplus.  
In Fig. 1, if farmers fulfill the quota, the amount of grain they deliver to the state, 
that is Q , will bring a producer surplus of area b−d. Upon quota fulfillment, farmers 
have the privilege to sell surplus grain on the market. To maximize profit, they will sell 
Q*− Q  of grain on the market at price P*, deriving a producer surplus of area e. The 
total producer surplus will be b−d+e. If farmers choose not to fulfill the quota, the profit-
maximizing output will be Qˆ =S( P ) and the producer surplus will be given by area b in 
Fig. 1. Whether farmers fulfill the quota Q  or just deliver an amount of Qˆ  to the 
government depends on the relative size of d and e. There are two possible cases 
assuming identical procurement and sales prices. 
Case 1: Area d ≤ Area e 
  In this case, b−d+e ≥ b. The procurement plan can be enforced as farmers will 
fulfill the quota. They will produce Q* and sell the surplus grain at P* after delivering 
Q  to the government at the procurement price P . The grain bureaus will then sell the 
quota amount at P  to eligible consumers. The producer surplus will be given by b−d+e 
whereas the consumer surplus by the sum of area BJUK and area EJW in Fig. 1. The 
equilibrium output will be the same as that under a free market. Social surplus will be 
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maximized as represented by area ABE. Compared with a free market, the procurement 
system will transfer an amount equal to (P*−P ) Q  from farmers to the industrial sector 
without changing the resource allocation. 
Case 2: Area d > Area e 
 In this case, b−d+e < b. Farmers will produce and deliver only Qˆ  to the state, 
forsaking the privilege to sell surplus grain on the market. The procurement plan cannot 
be enforced. Compared with a free market situation, there is a deadweight loss equal to 
area EFH in Fig. 1.  
The analysis of the two cases shows that farmers’ behavior under the procurement 
system imposes a constraint on the choice of the procurement price and quota. If 
the P , Q  combination is chosen appropriately, the procurement plan can be enforced 
enabling the government to redistribute income without compromising allocative 
efficiency. This result is consistent with those in Sicular (1988) and Lau et al. (2000). In 
particular, the system redistributes income from the grain sector to the industrial sector 
when the procurement price is set below the equilibrium market price.  
The state plan will be successfully enforced if the procurement price and quota 
are set at the levels that make farmers willing to comply. For any given quota, there is a 
minimum procurement price (MPP) that induces compliance. The minimum MPP curve, 
as depicted by OM-E in Fig. 2, gives the minimum procurement prices associated with 
different quotas. It divides all combinations of procurement price and quota in Fig. 2 into 
two regions. The one on or above the curve comprises all those combinations that induce 
quota fulfillment without distorting resource allocation. The combinations below the 
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curve entail enforcement failure making the total quantity supplied of commercial grain 
less than the free market equilibrium level.  
 
[Insert Fig. 2.] 
 
There are three segments to the MPP curve as depicted by OM, M-, and -E in 
Fig. 2. Segment -E corresponds to the case where the minimum procurement price 
exceeds b0 in Fig. 1. It traces out all the P , Q  combinations for which the procurement 
price is above b0 and area e = area d in Fig. 1. NE is upward sloping because any 
increase in the procurement quota will reduce the amount farmers sell to the free market 
and the associated producer surplus (i.e. area e in Fig. 1). To induce farmers to fulfill a 
larger quota, a higher procurement price must be offered. Note that any increase in the 
procurement price will increase producer surplus, as measured by area b along -E.
10
 
Therefore, movements along the MPP curve from point - to point E entail rising 
producer surplus. In particular, producer surplus equals zero at point -. When the P , Q  
combination is set at point E, quota fulfillment under the procurement system will bring 
to farmers the same amount of producer surplus as under a free market.    
 
[Insert Fig. 3.] 
 
Segment M- corresponds to the case where the minimum procurement price is 
positive but below b0. This case is illustrated in Fig. 3. Suppose theP , Q  combination is 
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 In Fig. 1, total producer surplus is given by b – d + e and d = e along -E. 
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given by point U. Without fulfilling the procurement quota, farmers cannot sell any grain 
on the market.  Unable to cover the marginal cost of any amount of grain delivered to the 
government at such a low price, their optimal supply of grain will be zero, and so will be 
the producer surplus. To induce farmers to fulfill the quota, the P , Q  combination must 
enable them to derive enough producer surplus from market sales, as indicated by area e, 
to compensate their loss in quota delivery, which is given by area d. The equality 
between area d and area e determines the minimum P  that is required for quota 
fulfillment. Note that in this case quota fulfillment only entails zero producer surplus. M- 
is upward sloping because an increase in procurement quota will reduce the gain from 
market sales, which must be balanced by an equal reduction in the loss incurred in quota 
delivery through upward adjustment in the procurement price.  Along the whole MN 
segment, producer surplus is zero.  
OM in Fig. 2 depicts the non-negative constraint on the minimum procurement 
price. Along OM, the procurement price is at its lowest possible value of zero requiring 
farmers to deliver grain to the government without receiving any payment. This quota 
delivery is virtually a tax in kind. Farmers are willing to deliver the free grain only 
because the subsequent access to the market enables them to derive sufficient producer 
surplus to compensate for the loss incurred in the quota delivery. When we move from 
the origin to point M, the procurement price remains zero while the quota increases, 
causing producer surplus to fall as an increasing amount of surplus is extracted from 
farmers. At the origin, producer surplus is the same as that under free market and it falls 
to zero at point M. 
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Let us take a closer look at some interesting P , Q  combinations on the MPP 
curve. One extreme case corresponds to the segment M- in Fig. 2. With these 
combinations, the government extracts the entire producer surplus. This is the extreme 
version of the case alleged by Gardner (1983) that the production-control approach in the 
form of Stalinist delivery quotas at state-set prices could be used to redistribute all 
producer surplus to consumers with relatively small deadweight loss. Another set of 
interestingP , Q  combinations is given by segment OM in Fig. 2. Any such combination 
is virtually a “grain tax” on farmers that is similar to a lump-sum tax. Thus the dual-track 
procurement system embraces the lump-sum tax scheme.
11
 As the result is important for 
later analysis, it is stated in the following lemma. 
 
Lemma 1: The dual-track procurement system embraces the lump-sum tax scheme.  
 
3.  The Optimal Choice of Procurement Price and Quota  
To analyze the optimal choice of the QP  ,  combination in China’s grain 
procurement system, we hypothesize that the policymaking process is not fundamentally 
different from that of other non-socialist countries. Chinese policymakers are assumed to 
be rational decision makers who seek to maximize their political preference function 
(PPF). However, as opposed to the standard PPF methodology that incorporates only the 
interest groups’ welfare (Bullock, 1994), our model specifies the function differently to 
characterize China’s political system. The decision-making of the Chinese leaders would 
                                                           
11
 As a matter of fact, the procurement quota assigned to farmers was a combination of the fixed 
procurement quota and a grain tax imposed on each piece of cultivated land according to its normal or 
expected grain output (Carter and Zhong, 1988). For simplicity, we only consider either pure quota 
procurement or pure lump-sum tax in the optimization model. 
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closely resemble that of an authoritarian leader identified by Baldwin (1996), whose 
decisions are heavily influenced by the ideologies that shape his economic and social 
views. Instead of being subject to direct political pressures from domestic interest groups, 
economic policies are made within the government bureaucracy where provincial 
governments and ministries organized by function negotiate for budget allocations or 
policies that would benefit their localities or sectors. We specify the PPF to capture the 
two major objectives of China’s grain procurement policy, both of which stemmed from 
the heavy industry-oriented development ideology adopted in the central planning period. 
The first one was to redistribute economic surpluses from the grain sector to the industrial 
sector and the second one was to safeguard food security for the urban non-agricultural 
population. The PPF also includes the welfare of grain farmers and urban consumers to 
completely capture the consideration of sectoral income distribution in the formulation of 
China’s grain procurement policy.  
The policymakers pursue the redistribution objective by suppressing grain prices 
in order to keep urban wages and industrial costs low. We hypothesize that any saving in 
grain procurement costs would be translated into an equal amount of saving in industrial 
costs. The amount of the transfer, denoted by G, equals the reduction in procurement cost 
under the quota procurement system as compared to a free market system. It can be 
expressed as follows.  
G = [P* − P ] Q > 0      
The urban food security objective is captured by the size of the procurement quota 
Q  in the PPF. The larger is the quota, the more cheap grain the government can make 
available to urban workers. When the policymakers are apprehensive about urban food 
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security, they will perceive the command of a larger procurement quota as better 
safeguard against insufficient urban food supply. 
Our model adopts a partial equilibrium analysis, which is quite common among 
the analyses using PPF (Oehmke and Yao, 1990; Lee and Kennedy, 2006). Taking other 
complementary grain policies as given, which would determine the market equilibrium 
illustrated in Fig. 1 largely through their influence on the supply curve of commercial 
grain, the model provides rigorous answers to the three questions identified in Section 1 
regarding the redistributive nature of China’s grain procurement system.  Consider the 
following political preference function. 
PPF = U(T, Q , CS, PS)            Ui >0, Uii <0 ∀ i 
where CS and PS denote consumer surplus of urban consumers and producer surplus of 
grain farmers respectively. T denotes the net transfer of economic surplus from the grain 
sector to the industrial sector, which is the gross transfer G introduced earlier net of any 
fiscal outlay incurred in grain marketing, which will be explained below.  
The policymakers choose the optimal QP  ,  combination that maximizes their 
PPF subject to the constraint governing plan enforcement as depicted by the area above 
and along the MPP curve. Let g( Q ) be the MPP curve that gives the minimum 
procurement price for quota Q . The actual procurement price is P = g( Q )+sp. Given 
that g( Q ) is already the minimum price to induce quota fulfillment, sp ≥ 0. A positive sp 
indicates that the procurement price is above the minimum level, i.e. in the area above the 
MPP curve. And the grain bureaus sell the procured grain to eligible buyers at or below 
the procurement price. Let g( Q )+sc denote the sales price. sc (≤ sp ) and can be positive 
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or negative. When sc < sp, the government finances the price difference with fiscal outlay, 
which is given by F = (sp − sc) Q .
12
  
The net transfer, denoted by T in the following expression, is positive indicating 
the amount of surpluses extracted from the grain sector and made available for industrial 
investment. 
T = G−F = [P*− g( Q )− sp] Q − (sp − sc) Q = [P*− g( Q )− 2sp+sc] Q          (1) 
To solve for the optimal QP  ,  combination, we need to derive the corresponding 
producer surplus and consumer surplus. The producer surplus is composed of two parts, 
one associated with the minimum procurement price and the other with sp. 
  PS = h( Q ) + sp Q                  (2) 
where h( Q ) is the producer surplus associated with quota fulfillment at the minimum 
price. As shown in the previous section, h′ ( Q ) < 0 along OM of the MPP curve in Fig. 
2; h′ ( Q ) = 0 along M-; and h′ ( Q ) > 0 along -E. As all the QP  ,  combinations 
associated with plan enforcement result in the same resource allocation as under the free 
market, where the social surplus is denoted by W*, the sum of consumer surplus, 
producer surplus, and net transfer to industry under quota fulfillment will also be W*. 
Therefore consumer surplus is given by  
CS = W* − PS − T = W* − PS − G + F. 
Using equations (1) and (2), we can rewrite the last equation as  
CS = W* − h( Q )− [P* − g( Q )] Q + (sp −  sc) Q . 
                                                           
12
 Sometimes the sales prices were increased together with the procurement prices. Then the fiscal 
outlay would be made in the form of allowances to urban workers if the government found it necessary to 
compensate them for the higher cost of living. 
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The following optimization problem represents policymakers’ choice of Q , sp 
and sc to maximize their PPF = U(T, Q , CS, PS). 
Max
ScSpQ  , ,
PPF=U[(P* − g− 2sp + sc) Q , Q , W* − h− (P* − g) Q + (sp −  sc) Q ,  h + sp Q ] 
subject to sp ≥ 0, sc ≤ sp 
The following first order conditions must be satisfied for interior solution where sc < sp.  
Q
U
∂
∂
=U1(P*−g− 2sp+sc− Q g′)+U2+U3[−h′−(P*−g)+sp− sc+ Q g′]+U4(h′+sp)=0        (3) 
ps
U
∂
∂
 = − 2U1 Q  + U3 Q  + U4 Q  
=
<
 0 for sp 
>
=
 0            (4) 
cs
U
∂
∂
 = U1 Q  − U3Q  = 0                (5) 
Equation (5) implies that U3=U1. Substituting this equality into equation (4), we 
have U4=U1 for interior solution that sp > 0. Substituting these equalities into equation (3) 
we have  
Q
U
∂
∂
 = U2 = 0,                  (6) 
which contradicts the assumption that U2 > 0. It implies that we cannot have interior 
solution for sp. 
For corner solution where sc = sp and hence F = (sp − sc) Q = 0, the PPF becomes 
U[(P* − g− sp) Q , Q , W* − h− (P* − g) Q ,  h + sp Q ]. 
The following first order conditions must be satisfied.  
Q
U
∂
∂
=U1(P*−g− sp− Q g′)+U2+U3[−h′−(P*−g)+ Q g′]+U4(h′+sp)=0                 (7) 
20 
 
ps
U
∂
∂
 = −U1 Q  + U4 Q  
=
<
 0 for  sp 
>
=
 0              (8) 
To have interior solution where sp > 0, equation (8) implies that U4=U1. 
Substituting this equality into equation (7), we have  
Q
U
∂
∂
= (U1 − U3) [h′+(P*−g) − Q g′]+U2 = 0 .            (9) 
Note that when sc = sp, the sum of producer surplus and transfer to industry under 
procurement plan enforcement is equal to the producer surplus under a free market.
13
 
Therefore the following value remains the same for all Q under quota fulfillment. 
PS + T = h( Q ) + [P* − g( Q )] Q . 
It follows that  
Q
)P(
∂
+∂ TS
=  h′ +(P*− g) − Q g′  = 0. 
Substituting this equality into equation (9), we have  
Q
U
∂
∂
 = U2 = 0,               (10) 
which contradicts the assumption that U2 > 0. Therefore equation (10) also implies that 
we cannot have interior solution for sp and its optimal value must be zero. Equations (4) 
and (5) in the case where sc < sp and equation (8) in the case where sc = sp both imply 
that 
U1 > U4. 
                                                           
13
 The equality can be verified with the help of Fig.1. When the procurement plan is enforced, PS 
= b – d + e whereas T = a + c + d.  PS + T = a + b + c + e, which is the producer surplus achieved under a 
free market. 
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Substituting the above findings into equations (3) and (7) respectively, we have the same 
result as follows. 
 
 - UU
U
 h
41
2'= > 0  
The above result answers the first two questions raised in this paper. First, as the 
optimal value of sp must be zero, farmers will only be paid the minimum procurement 
price necessary to induce quota delivery. For any procurement price above the minimum 
level, there exists another price on the MPP curve that can achieve a larger quota while 
leaving the incoming distribution unchanged. From the policymakers’ perspective, any 
extra amount paid to farmers above the minimum price would better be spent to enlarge 
the procurement quota.  
The above implication is consistent with what happened under the dual-track 
grain procurement system until 1993. Following the price liberalization in the mid-1980s 
of cash crops and agricultural inputs, especially chemical fertilizers, as well as the rapid 
development of rural industries, the opportunity costs of grain production surged in the 
second half of the 1980s. To induce quota fulfillment, the policymakers had no choice but 
to adjust the grain procurement price upward. However, the Chinese government was 
reluctant to raise the grain sales price for fear of political risk associated with rising food 
prices. As a result, the procurement price rose above the sales price, i.e. sc < sp, leading to 
mounting fiscal deficits. The higher procurement price offered to farmers was only to 
compensate for their rising costs to induce quota delivery. They still received only the 
minimum price. Even if fiscal outlay is incurred in the marketing of grain, it is to reduce 
the sales price to consumers but not to benefit farmers. That is why various Chinese 
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researchers perceive urban consumers as the only beneficiaries of the price subsidies 
offered in this period (Ke, 1995; Tuan and Cheng, 1999).
14
  
The result of the optimization problem also answers the second question 
regarding the choice between the quota procurement system and the lump-sum tax 
scheme. As h′ must be positive, the optimalP , Q  combination must lie on the upward-
sloping segment -E but not any other segment of the MPP curve in Fig. 2.  In particular, 
it will not lie on the segment OM that corresponds to the lump-sum tax scheme. This 
illuminates the advantage of the dual-track procurement system over the lump-sum tax 
scheme. The reason is that for any amount of surplus extractable from any quota along 
OM by imposing a lump-sum grain tax, there will be a larger quota along -E that can 
extract the same amount of surplus via the dual-track system.  
While it is well established in the literature that lump-sum tax is the most efficient 
way of transferring income in the absence of administrative cost, it is common among 
developing countries to adopt distorting price intervention instead. A well-acknowledged 
explanation is that their underdeveloped fiscal system renders lump-sum tax infeasible 
(Sah and Stiglitz, 1992). Nevertheless, the way in which China’s dual-track procurement 
system operates would not make its administrative costs lower than that of a lump-sum 
tax scheme. The urban food security objective appears to be a more convincing 
explanation for the choice of China’s policymakers. This view is substantiated by an 
incident that occurred in the 1990s. 
                                                           
14
 The price subsidies should be distinguished from another type of government outlay incurred in 
financing the inefficient operations and the rent-seeking behavior of the grain bureaus. While it reflects a 
significant issue of the implementation problems, they are beyond the scope of this paper.  
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Beginning in 1993 with the “unification of procurement and sales prices,” grain 
rations and subsidies to urban consumers were abolished nationwide. It was a measure to 
reduce budget deficits incurred in grain marketing. In terms of the optimization model, it 
was a policy to eliminate price subsidies by setting identical procurement price and sales 
price, i.e. sp = sc. There was also an attempt to liberalize the grain markets to allow 
increased participation of private traders. Subsequent to some unexpected price surges, 
however, the policy was reversed in 1994 to make quota delivery compulsory again 
whereby the grain bureaus regained control of at least 70 percent of grain marketing 
(MoA, 1995). A research program jointly conducted by China’s Ministry of Agriculture 
and the World Bank in the early 1990s would shed light on the reason for the policy 
reversal. One of the studies was to consider an alternative system that imposed a simple 
grain tax on farmers and purchased from them additional quantity of grain on the free 
market.
 
It was estimated that even if the alternative system, with a proposed increase in 
tax rate from 3 percent to 7 percent, could have exactly the same redistribution effect as 
the quota procurement system, it would not enable the government to secure a sufficient 
amount of commercial grain (Guo, 1995). This finding illuminates the fact that a simple 
grain tax is a deficient instrument as far as urban food security is concerned. 
Before we analyze the apparent switch in the policy stance from taxing to 
subsidizing grain production at end-1996, let us summarize the result of the maximization 
problem in the following proposition.  
 
Proposition 1: Given the specified political preference function with urban food security 
being one of the arguments, the optimal procurement price is always at the minimum 
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level necessary to induce quota fulfillment and the quota procurement system is preferred 
to the lump sum tax scheme. 
 
The role of urban food security in guiding grain procurement policy is pivotal in 
the explanation of the change in China’s policy stance from taxing to subsidizing grain 
production. Let us examine the case where urban food security is no longer a concern of 
the policymakers. The corresponding PPF would have the procurement quota removed, 
i.e. U2 = 0 whereas Ui >0 for i = 1, 3, 4. Note that the derivation of our previous results 
depends on the assumption that U2 is not zero (see equations (6) and (10)). Now that U2 
= 0, we can solve equations (3), (4) with equality sign, and (5) for the optimal values 
of Q , sp and sc or solve equations (7) and (8) with equality sign for the optimal values of 
Q   and sp (= sc). We can have interior solution for sp meaning that the procurement price 
can be higher than the minimum level given by the MPP curve. In such a case, the 
procurement price and sales price are set according to the political weights of the three 
interest groups, namely, the industrial sector, the urban consumers and the grain farmers 
in the PPF given by U1, U3, and U4 respectively. Therefore, when urban food security 
ceases to be a guiding objective, farmers can be paid more than the minimum 
procurement price if their welfare occupies a significant weight in policymakers’ 
preference. 
Proposition 1 does not apply to the situation in China beginning at end-1996 when 
consecutive years of bumper harvests in the mid-1990s resulted in substantial declines in 
market prices of grain. Since then the procurement prices have been higher than the 
market prices from time to time. This development could be attributed to two major 
25 
 
changes that altered the PPF. The first one affected the urban food security objective. The 
impressive post-reform growth of almost two decades led to a substantial increase in 
incomes of the city and township households. The overall share of grain consumption in 
their household budget dropped from above 22 percent in the 1950s and 1960s to 13 
percent in the early 1980s and further to below 7 percent in 1996 (ZJXZ, 1996; NBS, 
1997). Food security for China’s urban residents would have ceased to be a pressing issue. 
It would no longer be imperative or even desirable for the state to command a large share 
of grain distribution. It suggests that Q  would have ceased to be an argument in the PPF. 
The second change was related to the redistribution objective. Since the mid-
1990s, China’s leaders have become increasingly concerned about farmers’ welfare for at 
least two reasons. First, rural poverty and disparity between urban and rural incomes have 
been acknowledged as a threat to social and political stability.
15
 Second, Brown’s (1995) 
controversial wake-up call of “who will feed China?” alerted the government to the threat 
of national food security. It prompted the attempt to safeguard farmers’ incomes against 
declining grain prices and thereby maintain their production incentives.  
In the context of setting the procurement price, farmers’ welfare would be 
considered as opposed to that of urban consumers and the surplus available for the 
industrial sector. In particular, the income distribution between grain farmers and 
consumers would be the major consideration. The increased political stake in the well-
being of farmers, especially those engaged in grain production, would have added greatly 
to the weight of the producer surplus in the PPF relative to that of the consumer surplus.  
                                                           
15
 The ratio of urban to rural per-capita income rose from 1.86 in 1985 to 2.86 in 1994 and reached 
3.11 in 2002 and 2003 (MoA, 2004). The link between rural poverty and social unrest in the countryside 
has been widely reported in the mass media (see, for example, Jingji Ribao (Economics Daily), 9 August 
2002; Bodeen, 2005).  
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It was against this backdrop that China implemented the price protection policy in 
November 1996. Whenever the free market prices fall below the state-set procurement 
prices, the grain bureaus will procure above-quota grain at protective prices. In that case, 
market-determined negotiated prices would be replaced by price floors set by individual 
local governments. As noted by Lu (1999), the policy signals a historical shift in the role 
of China’s grain pricing policy. Instead of extracting economic surpluses from the grain 
sector, now the government subsidizes grain production and farmers. Deriving net 
transfer from the grain sector would have ceased to be a policy objective. 
 
[Insert Fig. 4.] 
 
To analyze the working of China’s grain procurement system after 1996, we need 
to modify the PPF. The net transfer T and the procurement quota Q  will be removed 
with only the consumer surplus and the producer surplus remaining, i.e. U1=U2=0, U3 >0 
and U4 >0. We will not give a complete analysis here as it is obvious that a substantial 
increase in the political weight of farmers’ welfare in the PPF could result in the 
procurement price rising even above the market price when price subsides are available. 
This is the case of grain procurement at protective prices that occurred in China between 
end-1996 and 1999 (Fig. 4).  
China’s leaders have stated repeatedly their adherence to the grain self-sufficiency 
policy to maintain national food security (Huang et al., 1999; Huang, 2004). The upward 
trend of assistance to grain farmers to boost their production incentive would only be 
contained by two factors, namely, the fiscal outlays that the government can afford and 
27 
 
the constraints imposed by WTO on China’s domestic grain marketing and trade policies. 
While the state-controlled grain procurement system is a possible instrument to help 
safeguard national food security by channeling transfers to farmers, the changes since the 
2000s reveal that it is not perceived by the policymakers as an effective instrument to 
serve this purpose. Starting from 2002, grain marketing was gradually liberalized 
decoupling many of the subsidies from state procurement.  That is, farmers get those 
subsidies whether they sell their grain to the state-own grain corporations or private 
traders. The liberalization of grain marketing is believed to be completed in 2004 
reflecting the ultimate relinquishment of the long-held ideology that the state should 
control grain distribution (Ye, 2004). 
 
4. Conclusion 
 China adopted the state-controlled grain procurement system in 1953 as an 
integral part of central planning to achieve the development goal of heavy 
industrialization. The policymaking process encompasses ideological, political, and 
economic considerations. Capturing the crucial objectives of sectoral income 
redistribution and urban food security with the political preference function, the present 
paper analyzes the choice of the procurement price and quota under the dual-track grain 
procurement system. Our approach has yielded some fruitful results offering coherent and 
rigorous explanations of three important aspects of China’s grain policies: the choice of 
the dual-track procurement system over the lump-sum tax scheme as a means of 
extracting economic surpluses from the grain sector, the suppression of the procurement 
price to its minimum until the mid-1990s and the switch from taxing to subsidizing grain 
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production at end-1996. Our findings underscore the paramount importance of the urban 
food security objective behind the evolution of China’s grain procurement policy. 
Many factors together determine the intricate developments of China’s grain 
procurement system. This paper attempts to perform a rigorous analysis of the policy 
formulation and inevitably omits many details regarding the implementation issues. 
Therefore our results should be read together with those in the literature to command a 
thorough understanding of the evolution of China’s grain policies. By identifying the 
roles of the grain procurement system as but one component of a whole set of 
complementary policies, this paper enables us to interpret and evaluate its evolution more 
accurately. In particular, the pursuit of national food security by means of self-sufficiency 
will not preclude the dismantling of the state-controlled grain procurement system, which 
only serves to safeguard food security for the non-agricultural sector. 
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Fig. 1. To deliver quota or not? 
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Fig. 2. Minimum procurement price (MPP) curve. 
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Fig. 3. When the procurement price is below b0. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4. Ratio of Procurement Price to Market Price of Grain, 1985-1999.
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 This chart is based on official data published in China's Agricultural Development Report 1996 
and 2003. Due to the lack of data, the market prices of grain are approximated by the negotiated prices that 
always lie between the procurement price and the market price. A ratio of greater (less) than one indicates 
that the procurement price is higher (lower) than the market price. The series ends at 1999 as no published 
data on negotiated prices are available after that year. 
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